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Audit committee (AC) responsibilities have been increasing over time, prompting concerns that 
overloading ACs may impair their effectiveness. Using new measures to capture AC 
responsibilities based on AC charters, we find that greater AC responsibilities are associated with 
improved financial statement reliability. Contrary to overload concerns, this association is 
strongest when ACs have very high levels of responsibilities. Cross-sectional analyses indicate 
greater AC responsibilities improve financial statement reliability at complex firms, following 
significant governance lapses, when AC members are capable and experienced, and when ACs also 
meet often to carry out their oversight duties. Further analysis suggests that our AC responsibility 
results are driven by duties related to financial reporting while, in stark contrast, allocating 
responsibilities unrelated to financial reporting to the AC (e.g., risk management) detracts from 
monitoring effectiveness by decreasing financial statement reliability. The latter is consistent with 
an overload effect driven by responsibilities that distract the AC from its core financial reporting 
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In this study, we examine the relation between the scope of audit committee (AC) oversight 
and financial reporting reliability. AC responsibilities have consistently increased over time and 
practitioners have raised concerns that ACs may be overloaded with too many duties. For example, 
forty percent of AC members polled by KPMG (2015) report that it is increasingly difficult to 
adequately fulfill all of the AC’s responsibilities. These concerns are in sharp contrast to the belief 
held by regulators that assigning ACs more oversight responsibilities enhances financial reporting 
(e.g., Beasley, Oxley, and Sarbanes 2012). Despite these diverging perspectives and the importance 
of this question, extant research is limited due to empirical challenges, particularly the inability to 
effectively measure the duties performed by ACs. We fill this gap by using AC charters, which 
delineate AC responsibilities, to analyze whether assigning the AC high levels of oversight 
responsibility enhances or impairs financial reporting reliability.  
ACs play an important role in corporate governance. Effective ACs promote the credibility 
of financial statements by monitoring accounting and reporting processes, overseeing financial 
statement attestation, and promoting a firm’s internal controls and regulatory compliance (Deloitte 
2013; PWC 2018). This financial reporting oversight is the core duty of ACs (Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Audit Committee Effectiveness 1999; SEC 1999a). Empowering ACs with greater 
responsibility related to this core mandate may enhance AC authority over management and the 
committee members’ familiarity with the accounting processes that inform financial statements, 
thus enabling the AC to more effectively promote financial reporting reliability. However, if 
responsibilities increase to the point of overload where ACs cannot fulfill them all, then adding 
more responsibilities may not improve reporting reliability, even if the responsibilities are related 
to financial reporting. If this is true, assigning the AC more duties may not necessarily harm 
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financial reporting but could be detrimental to corporate governance by providing the board (and 
investors) with a “false sense of security” with regards to oversight provided by the AC. 
While having too many responsibilities may stress the AC’s ability to complete them all, 
AC overload that impairs reporting reliability is more likely driven by responsibilities that distract 
the AC from its core mandate to oversee financial reporting. Some AC responsibilities are indeed 
unrelated to financial reporting per se, and ACs that try to do too many different things may not 
do any one thing very well (Ernst & Young 2014; KPMG 2014). For example, AC oversight over 
financial risk management (including hedging programs and asset management) has increased 
significantly over time, prompting Deloitte to caution that “boards should take care not to 
overburden the audit committee with risk oversight responsibilities” (Deloitte 2014, 2018, pg. 1). 
Many AC members surveyed by KPMG (2015) reported that risk-related responsibilities make it 
difficult for them to carry out their core responsibilities related to financial reporting. To the extent 
that oversight responsibilities unrelated to financial reporting detract from AC members’ ability to 
carry out their core financial reporting oversight, we predict a negative association between such 
extraneous oversight duties and financial reporting reliability.  
To study whether ACs may be overloaded, we measure AC responsibilities using AC 
charters. AC charters describe the responsibilities ACs perform, must be reviewed annually by the 
AC, and are disclosed publicly (PWC and IIARF 2011; SEC 1999b; SEC 1999c; SEC 1999d).1 
We hand-collect a sample of AC charters from 2000 to 2006 and proxy for the overall scope of 
AC oversight using the length of an AC’s charter in a given year (i.e., the number of words in a 
charter). During this time period, the SEC required that public companies include a copy of their 
                                                          
1 It is the AC’s responsibility to adopt a charter and to reassess its adequacy on an annual basis. The charter and any 




AC charter as an appendix to their proxy statement at least once every three years (SEC 2000).2 
According to AC directors who collectively chair or serve on ten ACs and with whom we held 
semi-structured interviews, ACs closely abide by their respective charters and perform every duty 
listed therein.3 As such, we posit that the length of the AC charter is an appropriate proxy for the 
depth of responsibilities performed by an AC.  
We begin our analysis by providing descriptive evidence to explain variation in AC 
responsibilities. We observe a general increase in AC charter length over time and a significant 
lengthening immediately following SOX. To investigate the uniqueness of our measure, we 
examine AC charter length as a function of variables commonly used in prior literature to proxy 
for AC and board characteristics. We find that the number of AC meetings is positively associated 
with AC charter length, which we expect since both variables capture the scope of AC activity to 
some degree.4 AC composition variables, including members’ expertise, also vary positively with 
AC charter length. After controlling for AC meetings, composition, and other AC and board 
characteristics, only 40 percent of the variation in AC charters is explained, indicating substantial 
unique variation in our measure relative to proxies used in prior literature. 
We then use our charter-based proxy to study the relation between the level of AC 
responsibilities and the reliability of financial reporting. We examine financial restatements as a 
salient measure of reporting reliability, finding that AC charter length is negatively associated with 
                                                          
2 This rule was modified in November 2006; now, firms can maintain a current version of the AC charter on their 
company website and simply refer to the website in the proxy statements. We end our sample in 2006 because it is 
difficult to reliably obtain a large historical sample of AC charters for November 2006 onwards as companies maintain 
current, rather than historical, versions of AC charters on their website after the rule change. 
3 AC members have a fiduciary duty to shareholders and are subject to potential civil and/or criminal liability if they 
fail to perform the functions listed in the AC charter (e.g., Lipman 2015). For example, fraud charges have been 
brought against individuals for “failure to carry out their responsibilities as … Audit Committee members” (SEC v. 
Krantz). An AC may perform responsibilities above and beyond those listed in its charter. While empirically this 
noise should not bias towards findings, we recognize this as a limitation of our measure. 
4 Prior research on AC meetings finds largely mixed results on impacting financial reporting quality, in part because 
of measurement and reverse causality issues; we discuss this in section 2.1.  
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the likelihood of restating, consistent with more AC responsibilities improving financial reporting 
reliability on average. This result is robust to entropy balancing, which helps to reduce potential 
bias in estimates that results from non-random treatment assignment.5 Further, we observe that the 
negative association between charter length and restatements is strongest in firms with the longest 
charters, reinforcing the notion that AC effectiveness is not impaired at high levels of oversight. 
In cross-sectional tests, we find results consistent with the intuition that greater AC oversight 
matters more at complex firms and following significant governance lapses. We also find that 
greater AC oversight improves reporting reliability most when AC members are highly capable 
and when ACs meet more often to carry out their oversight duties.  
Since financial reporting oversight is the AC’s overarching duty (the vast majority of AC 
responsibilities are related to financial reporting oversight, as evident in Appendix B), the total 
length of the AC charter likely proxies for the scope of AC financial reporting oversight. 
Accordingly, we find no evidence of overload using this proxy: while increasing financial 
reporting-related responsibilities may stress the AC’s ability to complete them all, it is unlikely to 
harm or detract from reporting reliability. Instead, as argued above, financial reporting reliability 
is more likely to suffer when AC overload arises from extraneous, ‘non-core’ responsibilities that 
distract from the AC’s core responsibility to monitor financial reporting.  
To examine this assertion, we construct content-specific measures that capture (1) the 
extent of the AC’s oversight of internal controls, which is part of the AC’s core oversight function, 
and (2) the extent of AC’s oversight of financial risk management, which is non-core oversight 
and could serve as a distraction. We focus on financial risk management in particular because of 
                                                          
5 Entropy balancing improves covariate balance between the treatment and controls groups by reweighting 
observations, which reduces model dependence when estimating a treatment effect. Entropy balancing does not 
mitigate bias resulting from self-selection. Selection is less of a threat in our setting because all public firms must 
disclose their AC charter. 
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its prevalence as an AC duty (e.g., in 2004, the New York Stock Exchange implemented a 
requirement that ACs review financial risk management) and because of practitioner concerns that 
such risk-related responsibility can detract from the committee’s ability to fulfill their main 
financial reporting oversight responsibility (e.g., Deloitte 2014). We find that the likelihood of 
restatements decreases as more of the AC’s responsibilities focus on internal control oversight, in 
both main and entropy-balanced samples, consistent with our charter length results largely 
measuring financial reporting duties. In stark contrast, we find that greater financial risk 
management oversight is associated with a greater likelihood of restatements in both main and 
entropy-balanced samples, indicating that non-core responsibilities distract the AC from its core 
oversight. The latter results are consistent with practitioner concerns that assigning extraneous 
oversight duties to the AC can harm financial reporting reliability, highlighting a potential 
unintended consequence of the regulatory effort to broaden the AC agenda (including the NYSE 
requirement that ACs review financial risk management).  
We conduct several additional analyses. First, we examine whether AC oversight acts as a 
compliment to or a substitute for external audit effort. We find that audit fees vary positively 
(negatively) with charter length and internal control-related duties (financial risk management 
oversight), consistent with the notion that ACs more focused on financial reporting demand greater 
monitoring provided by the external auditor. Second, we examine the robustness of our main 
results to using an alternate measure of financial reporting responsibilities based on a count of a 
broad list of accounting terms contained in the Oxford Dictionary of Accounting. We find 
consistent results using this alternate content-based measure. Third, to ensure that our charter-
based measures are not driven by a firm’s disclosure tendency, we include the length of the 10-K 
as a control and find consistent results.  
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We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we provide empirical evidence regarding 
the implications of assigning ACs a greater role in corporate governance. To our knowledge, we 
are the first to investigate whether assigning the AC greater responsibilities makes the AC more 
effective in promoting financial reporting reliability. Our results support the belief of regulators 
that ACs with more responsibilities are more effective in promoting financial reporting reliability 
but only when those duties are related to financial reporting.6 At the same time, our findings lend 
credence to the concerns of practitioners that AC “scope creep” can impair the oversight of 
financial reporting when additional oversight responsibilities are unrelated to financial reporting. 
This is a particularly important insight given the overall trend to assign ACs more non-core duties, 
such as the 2004 regulatory change at the NYSE that increased the scope of AC oversight to 
include financial risk management oversight. Second, we develop new and unique measures that 
capture the extent and type of AC oversight. Our measures complement, but are distinct from, 
existing measures and should be considered in future research studying AC effectiveness or 
corporate governance.  
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Audit Committee Research 
Studies of audit committees date back at least to Greene and Falk (1979), who suggest that 
a good audit committee is an integral part of the board at-large. Since that time, and especially in 
recent years, the AC has increased in importance and responsibility. The academic literature over 
this time has examined characteristics associated with AC effectiveness, commonly discussing the 
                                                          
6 For example, in an interview on July 30, 2012, Paul Sarbanes discusses how SOX strengthens AC oversight of the 
external auditors, saying that the increased AC responsibility is “making an important difference” in promoting 
honest record keeping and meaningful financial statements (Beasley, Oxley, and Sarbanes 2012). 
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AC in terms of three key dimensions: (1) composition, (2) resources, and (3) authority (DeZoort 
et al. 2002; Bedard and Gendron 2010; Cohen et al. 2014).  
AC composition studies are the most common, especially those examining committee 
members’ independence and financial expertise (DeZoort et al. 2002; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, 
and Scholz 2011). Numerous studies document an association between AC independence or 
financial expertise and better monitoring, measured using restatements, SEC sanctions for 
misreporting, earnings management proxies, disclosure metrics, accounting conservatism, audit 
fees, auditor selection, audit quality, and internal control weaknesses (Abbott and Parker 2000; 
Abbott, Park, and Parker 2000; Carcello and Neal 2000; Klein 2002; Abbott, Parker, Peters, and 
Raghunandan 2003; Xie, Wallace, and DaDalt 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Bedard, Chtourou, and 
Courteau 2004; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Krishnan 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; 
Badolato et al. 2014).7,8  
 The effectiveness of ACs also depends on their access to resources they need to do their 
job (e.g., Jaggi 2019). Such resources include having enough committee members as well as access 
to information from relevant entities, including management, auditors, legal counsel, and the full 
board (DeZoort et al. 2002). For lack of a better proxy, studies in this literature focus mainly on 
the size of the AC as a measure of resources; however, evidence linking AC size to AC 
effectiveness is weak. For example, while Bedard et al. (2004) report some evidence that AC size 
is associated with less aggressive earnings management, Xie et al. (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004) 
report that AC size is not significantly associated with accruals and restatements, respectively.  
                                                          
7 Beginning in 1999, the stock exchanges require listed firms to have fully independent ACs and this requirement is 
also legally mandated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Klein 2002; SEC 2003). 
8 SOX Section 407 requires that issuers disclose whether they have at least one financial expert on the AC, the name 
of the expert, and whether the expert is independent. An “audit committee financial expert” has (1) an understanding 
of GAAP and financial statements, (2) direct experience preparing or evaluating financial statements or experience 
supervising individuals engaged in these activities, (3) an understanding of internal controls and financial reporting 
procedures, and (4) an understanding of AC functions.  
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Finally, AC authority is a function of the AC’s influence and responsibilities (DeZoort et 
al. 2002). Badolato et al. (2014) examine the influence of the AC using a measure of the status of 
AC members relative to management, finding that relative status is important in determining AC 
effectiveness in promoting financial reporting quality. In terms of responsibilities, Bratten, 
Causholi, and Sulcaj (2019) find that financial reporting quality improves when ACs take a more 
active role in overseeing the external audit. Numerous studies rely on AC meetings frequency as 
a measure of the diligence of the AC in carrying out their responsibilities, or put another way, the 
quantity of AC oversight (Raghunandan and Rama 2007; Bedard and Gendron 2010). Extant 
evidence on the association between AC meetings and monitoring effectiveness is mixed. Some 
studies find that the number of AC meetings is associated with improved monitoring, as observed 
by fewer restatements (Abbott et al. 2004), less aggressive earnings management (Bedard et al. 
2004), auditor selection and audit quality (Abbott and Parker 2000; Abbott and Parker 2002), and 
fewer fraud indictments (Farber 2005). Other studies find that the number of meetings is associated 
with more restatements (Sharma and Iselin 2012) and more internal control weaknesses (Krishnan 
and Visvanathan 2007). Some studies also report insignificant results, including Lin, Li, and Yang 
(2006), Krishnan (2005), and Abbott et al. (2003). Overall, there is no consensus in the literature 
regarding the association between AC meetings and AC effectiveness.9  
The mixed evidence in the AC meetings literature largely stems from measurement issues. 
For example, there are significant reverse causality concerns with AC meetings: more meetings 
may be associated with higher financial reporting quality if ACs are proactively overseeing 
financial reporting but more meetings may also be a response by the AC to address financial 
                                                          
9 Building on the review of Bedard and Gendron (2010), we identify 57 studies that test the relation between AC 
meetings and various measures of outcomes of AC effectiveness. Fifty-eight percent of these studies find no 
relationship, 37 percent find a positive relationship, and 5 percent find a negative relationship. 
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reporting or internal control problems that arise during the year. Additionally, the meetings 
measure does not capture the amount of time spent in meetings or the effort expended by AC 
members outside of meetings, which can be significant. For example, four two-hour meetings may 
cover the same scope as eight one-hour meetings, though the AC meetings proxy implies an AC 
with eight meetings is more diligent.10 Relative to the AC meetings measure, our charter-based 
measure is less prone to these measurement issues and better captures the construct of the scope 
of AC oversight. In particular, our charter-based measure does not suffer from the reverse causality 
issue because AC charters are determined in advance and are unlikely to change during the year 
in response to financial reporting or internal control problems. 
In summary, extant literature finds that AC composition (specifically, independence and 
financial expertise) is associated with monitoring effectiveness, but studies on AC resources and 
responsibilities are inconclusive. We help to fill this gap in the literature by developing new 
measures of AC responsibilities using AC charters and studying their association with financial 
reporting reliability.  
2.2 Hypotheses 
Capital market participants depend on financial statement reliability to mitigate agency 
costs of information asymmetry that arise due to the separation of ownership and management 
(Healy and Palepu 2001). The central role of the AC is to enhance or maintain investor confidence 
in financial reports and thereby encourage the efficient functioning of financial markets (PWC and 
IIARF 2011). Practically, ACs do this by providing oversight over the financial reporting process, 
thus promoting the reliability of financial reports and disclosures that are disseminated to the 
                                                          
10 There are other limitations of the AC meetings proxy as well. For example, companies diverge in their assessment 
of what constitutes an AC meeting that they must report. In some cases, reported meetings include only those that 
occur in person, while others include all occasions during which the committee acted unanimously, whether in person, 
via teleconference, or in emails.  
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market (Bedard and Gendron 2010). Anecdotally, AC members we interviewed asserted that they 
perceive and take this responsibility seriously, emphasizing the processes and procedures they 
follow to exercise oversight over financial reporting, including selecting and evaluating the 
auditor, monitoring internal controls, and reviewing disclosures among other duties.  
Given the importance of the AC in monitoring financial reporting, increasing the oversight 
responsibilities of the AC may improve financial reporting reliability. Extensive oversight 
responsibility gives the AC a holistic and deeper understanding of a firm, its management, its 
financial reporting process, and the control environment. A better overall understanding of a firm’s 
financial reporting process enables the AC to ask pointed questions of management and hold 
management accountable for financial reporting. It also allows the AC to play a more active role 
in addressing concerns raised by external and internal constituents. Furthermore, empowering ACs 
with greater oversight responsibility enhances the AC’s authority over management. This is 
particularly important because, in the end, it is up to management to implement changes 
recommended by the AC. These arguments suggest that increasing the scope of AC oversight 
should increase the committee’s monitoring effectiveness and the overall reliability of financial 
reporting. 
Alternatively, it is possible that increasing the scope of oversight does not increase 
monitoring effectiveness because the AC becomes overburdened. In our semi-structured 
interviews with AC directors, one AC chairperson warned of “audit committee overload” when 
discussing their view on AC responsibilities. We define overload as the accumulation of 
responsibilities to the point where one cannot reasonably accomplish them all effectively. 
Concerns about AC overload began to proliferate as expectations of ACs increased with the 
corporate governance reform in the late 1990s and early 2000s, (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee, 
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Sarbanes-Oxley, etc.). At that time, governance professionals cited ‘critical concern’ that ACs 
faced an onslaught of new rules and roles, rising workloads and heavy agendas, and unrealistic 
expectations (e.g., Hunt and Carey 2001; Zaman 2001; Bill and Matthews 2007). Such concerns 
have persisted in the time since. For example, Ernst & Young (2014) notes that the role of an AC 
member has become more demanding, in part because regulators and investors ask the AC to take 
on increasing responsibilities. In a survey conducted by KPMG (2015), 74 percent of AC members 
reported a significant or moderate increase in the amount of time required to carry out their 
responsibilities, and 40 percent of respondents reported that it is increasingly difficult to meet all 
of the AC’s responsibilities. If oversight responsibilities increase to the point where ACs cannot 
fulfill them all, then adding more responsibilities may not improve reporting reliability, even if the 
additional responsibilities relate directly to financial reporting. Thus, while an increase in oversight 
responsibilities may improve financial reporting reliability, the alternative overload hypothesis 
suggests that it may have no benefit. We state our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: The scope of audit committee responsibilities is positively associated with financial 
reporting reliability. 
When creating an oversight agenda, the board and AC generally allocate responsibilities to 
the AC that keep with the committee’s core mandate to monitor financial reporting.11 However, 
this is not always the case. In an article aptly titled “Audit Committee Workload – Keeping an Eye 
on the Ball”, KPMG (2014) highlights the concern that many ACs are being asked to take on 
oversight responsibilities that are unrelated to financial reporting and that such non-core duties can 
detract from the AC’s ability to effectively monitor the processes that ultimately inform financial 
reporting. AC chairs interviewed by KPMG (2014) note that oversight of financial reporting is a 
                                                          
11 See Appendix B for a listing of common AC responsibilities based on our manual analysis of AC charters. 
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significant undertaking on its own and that agendas laden with additional responsibilities 
(especially risk oversight) make the role of the AC the most demanding in governance. Indeed, 
when asked to do too much, ACs must allot their time and effort across more tasks — some that 
ultimately inform financial reporting and others that do not. Thus, overload of AC members may 
be especially problematic when driven not only by an excessive quantity of responsibilities in 
general as in H1, but by the inclusion of extraneous responsibilities that distract AC members from 
their core responsibility. This distraction hypothesis suggests that the more non-financial-reporting 
(i.e., non-core) oversight responsibility the AC amasses, the more likely it is that the AC devotes 
inadequate time and effort to financial reporting oversight activities. Accordingly, we state our 
second hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H2: The scope of non-core audit committee responsibilities is negatively associated with 
financial reporting reliability. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Data  
Beginning in December 2000, the SEC required all public companies to include a copy of 
their AC charter as an appendix to their proxy statement at least once every three years (SEC 
2000). However, this rule was relaxed in November 2006 such that public companies are now 
required to maintain a current version of the AC charter on their company website and simply 
refer to the website in the proxy statements (SEC 2006). The historical requirement to disclose the 
AC charter in proxy statements (which every public company is subject to) allows us to manually 
gather a time series of AC charters from 2000 to 2006.  
Consequently, as summarized in Table 1, we begin our sample with 18,753 firm-year 
observations between 2000 and 2006 that are on Compustat and can be matched to AC data on 
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BoardEx. We then identify 21,114 DEF-14A proxy filings on SEC EDGAR filed by these firms 
between December 15, 2000 (the start of SEC regulation requiring proxy filings to include AC 
charters every third year) and November 7, 2006 (the end of the SEC requirement to include AC 
charters in proxy filings every third year). Using a textual search, we eliminate 2,461 proxy filings 
that do not mention the words “audit committee charter” or “charter of the audit committee” in the 
DEF-14A at least once. We then enlist research assistants to help us manually analyze the content 
of the 18,653 remaining proxy filings and manually extract the AC charter and the number of AC 
meetings from these filings.12,13 This results in 10,070 firm-year observations that include an AC 
charter. We eliminate 44 observations that are not on a major US stock exchange (i.e., NASDAQ, 
NYSE, and AMEX), resulting in a base sample of 10,026 Compustat firm-year observations at the 
intersection of our hand collected AC charter data and AC data available on BoardEx.14  
In addition to Compustat and BoardEx, we merge our AC charter data with Thomson 
Reuters and Audit Analytics to calculate variables as necessary. For our restatements analyses, this 
results in 5,629 firm-year observations. The samples used in additional tests vary based on the 
availability of data to compute variables specific to each analysis. For example, in our determinants 
tests reported in Table 4, the sample consists of 6,924 firm-year observations because the model 
is more parsimonious than our restatements model, which we discuss in the next section. 
3.2 Model 
We test our hypotheses by estimating an OLS model as follows:  
RESTATEit = β0 + β1Charter Variable + β2AC_MEETINGSit + βnGovernance Controls               (1)  
                                                          
12 More specifically, we had research assistants manually examine each proxy statement, locate the AC charter if the 
proxy statement has one, and copy and paste the whole AC charter into a separate text file. We use the text file for 
each AC charter for all subsequent analyses. 
13 Firms are required to disclose the number of AC meetings in their proxy statement (see 17 CFR 229.407(b)). 
14 To verify integrity of the charter-gathering process (i.e., to ascertain that AC charters were properly identified and 
accurately extracted), we randomly selected proxy filings every time a research assistant finished the assigned task. 
This resulted in a manual analysis by at least one co-author of 600 proxy filings. In so doing, we observed a type one 
and type two error rate of less than 1 percent. 
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+ βmOther Controls + βiStock Exchange FE + βjIndustry FE + βkYear FE + εit, 
 
where the dependent variable, RESTATE, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i restates year 
t’s 10-K subsequent to original issuance, and zero otherwise.15 RESTATE encompasses both “Big 
R” (which require 8-K Item 4.02 disclosure) and “little r” restatements, obtained from Audit 
Analytics.16  We focus on RESTATE because financial misstatements are a salient indicator of poor 
financial reporting reliability commonly used in the literature (e.g., Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 
2010). The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the effect of AC oversight using one of 
three Charter Variables: CHARTER_LENGTH, IC_COUNT, and FINRISK_COUNT.  
To test our overload hypothesis (H1), we create a measure of the scope of AC oversight 
using the length of the AC charter, CHARTER_LENGTH, calculated as the natural log of the 
number of words in the AC charter of firm i in year t.17 A negative coefficient on 
CHARTER_LENGTH would be consistent with greater AC responsibilities making an AC more 
effective in overseeing the financial reporting process. Alternatively, as we argue in our hypothesis 
development, greater duties may overburden the AC and thus may have no impact on financial 
reporting reliability. 
We believe the length of the AC charter is an appropriate proxy for the amount of AC 
responsibilities because the AC charter lists the responsibilities that ACs must perform throughout 
the year. Consistent with this notion, the charter’s purpose and importance have been stressed by 
both regulators and academics. For example, the SEC notes that “audit committees that have their 
                                                          
15 Our main dependent variable (RESTATE) is binary. To avoid the incidental parameters problem (Greene 2004), we 
report results of employing a linear probability model instead of a logistic model. To ensure our results are not driven 
by this design choice, we rerun our main analyses with logistic regression (untabulated) and find consistent results. 
16 To use only Item 4.02 restatements is to drastically limit our sample, since these only exist from 2004 on.   
17 In untabulated analysis, we calculate two alternate definitions of CHARTER_LENGTH. We observe similar results 
when using the natural log of the number of unique words in the AC charter and when scaling CHARTER_LENGTH 
by the number of audit committee members.  
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responsibilities set forth in a written charter are more likely to play an effective role in overseeing 
the company's financial reports” and that firms should tailor the charters to their specific 
circumstances (SEC 2000). Per regulatory requirements, the charter must specify the scope of the 
AC’s responsibilities and how the AC carries out those responsibilities, including structure, 
processes, and membership requirements (SEC 1999b; SEC 1999c; SEC 1999d). In light of the 
AC’s fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, the AC charter also informs committee members of 
the matters for which they can be held personally liable (Lipman 2015). 
Further, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) speak of the charter as an instrument for establishing 
the authority and mandate of the AC and DeZoort et al. (2002) state that “the audit committee 
charter has become an increasingly important document for helping audit committee members 
focus on their specific responsibilities and for helping stakeholders assess the role and 
responsibilities of the audit committee” (p.44). Bohm, et al. (2016) and Abbott, Parker, Peters, and 
Rama (2007) also argue that the AC charter is informative for understanding the role of the AC.18 
These papers, along with Carcello et al. (2002), provide evidence of meaningful variation in the 
content and scope of audit committee charters and dispel the possibility that the charters are 
entirely boilerplate. Taken together, the findings of academics and perspectives of regulators help 
confirm what AC members reported to us in interviews: that the AC charter is a useful public 
signal of actual AC responsibilities.  
To better understand the content of AC charters, we closely examine 100 randomly-
selected charters from our sample period. In Appendix B, we provide a listing of topics that appear 
                                                          
18 Bohm et al. (2016) manually analyze the content of AC charters from a sample of 202 firms in 2010 in the US, 
Europe and Australia, creating a count of distinct AC responsibilities in each charter. They show that this charter-
based scope of oversight differs significantly from one firm to another and document a positive and significant 
association between AC charter scope and the number of AC meetings. In a sample of 219 firms, Abbott, Parker, 
Peters, and Rama (2007) use an indicator for firms in 2000 whose charters stipulate that the AC reviews internal audit 
plans and results; they find that ACs who perform this review are negatively correlated with outsourcing routine 
internal audit tasks.  
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in these charters, along with the related regulations, if applicable. We find that, while many topics 
in the charters are tied to AC responsibilities stipulated by the SEC and/or stock exchanges (e.g., 
AC responsibility for auditor selection is required by stock exchanges and codified by SOX), many 
are not (e.g., AC review of IT controls, taxes, investments, etc.). We observe numerous charter 
topics relating to financial reporting, internal control, and external audit. We also note other 
common topic areas, including internal audit, regulatory compliance, and financial risk 
management. This detailed analysis supports the notion that AC charters are far from boilerplate.  
Our second hypothesis – the distraction hypothesis – addresses the notion that duties that 
distract the AC from overseeing financial reporting may impair the overall reliability of a firm’s 
financial reports. To test this hypothesis, we develop two content-specific measures based on AC 
charters – IC_COUNT and FINRISK_COUNT. The first measure, IC_COUNT, is the total number 
of internal control-related terms in the AC charter of firm i in year t, scaled by the total word length 
of the same charter and multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience.19 This measure captures 
AC duties that are clearly related to financial reporting. As such, we do not expect distraction by 
these duties. Rather, given how critical internal controls are to financial reporting (e.g., DeFond 
and Zhang 2014), we expect an improvement in financial reporting reliability as the AC focuses 
more on overseeing internal controls, which should manifest as a negative coefficient on 
IC_COUNT, or no effect. 
For the second measure, our goal is to capture the extent of “extraneous” oversight 
responsibility undertaken by the AC – or duties clearly unrelated to financial reporting. In 
constructing such a measure, we rely on anecdotal evidence that highlights risk oversight as the 
                                                          
19 We create a list of internal control-related words by reading 50 random AC charters and manually identifying 
words that relate to oversight of internal controls. The words we count are internal control, material weakness, 
significant deficiency, control deficiency, and control weakness, and their plural equivalents. 
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major area of AC responsibilities that is not related to the AC’s core mandate. This evidence 
suggests that extensive risk oversight responsibility may impair the committee’s monitoring of 
financial reporting (KPMG 2014, 2015). Since ACs are more likely to oversee financial risk as 
opposed to operational and other types of risk (e.g., Bill and Matthews 2007; KPMG 2015), we 
examine the association between the extent of financial risk oversight and financial reporting 
reliability. To create a measure of financial risk oversight we first read 50 random AC charters and 
manually identify words that relate to financial risk.20 We calculate FINRISK_COUNT as the total 
number of financial risk-related terms in the AC charter of firm i in year t, scaled by the length of 
the same charter in words and multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience. If non-core duties 
overburden an AC and prevent the AC from effectively overseeing financial reporting, then the 
coefficient on FINRISK_COUNT should be positive. 
We include in Equation (1) a number of control variables. First, because prior literature 
uses AC meetings to measure the AC’s oversight responsibilities, we include AC_MEETINGS as 
a control in all multivariate analyses. By controlling for AC_MEETINGS, we identify the 
incremental effect of CHARTER_LENGTH. We define AC_MEETINGS as the number of meetings 
firm the AC of firm i holds during year t. Second, we include control variables that prior literature 
has shown to impact the quality of a firm’s corporate governance or financial reporting: 
ACCT_EXPERTISE, LEGAL_EXPERTISE, AC_BUSY, AC_SIZE, AC_TENURE, BOARD_SIZE, 
BOARD_INDEP, and CEO_CHAIRMAN (e.g., Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell 1997; Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Carcello and Neal 2000; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; 
                                                          
20 The NYSE states that “the audit committee should discuss the listed company's major financial risk exposures and 
the steps management has taken to monitor and control such exposures” (NYSE Listed Company Manual 
§303A.07[b][iii][D]). The words we count include: 'financial risk', 'financial exposure', 'hedg*', 'derivativ*', 'swaps', 
'forward contracts', 'commodity', 'commodities', 'interest rate', 'foreign exchange', 'exchange rate', 'currency', 
'currencies', 'futures', 'trading', 'stock options', 'put options', 'call options', 'treasury', ‘asset management', 
'investments', 'investing', 'capital structure', 'debt', and 'equity'.  
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Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Krishnan, Wen, and Zhao 2011). We include these variables to 
illustrate that our charter-based measures are distinct from other measures that may capture 
governance quality. Third, we control for factors commonly included in restatements models by 
prior literature. These variables are SIZE, MTB, LEVERAGE, ISSUANCE, ROA, and INST_OWN 
(Badolato, Donelson, and Ege 2014). All these control variables are defined in Appendix A.  
IV. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
We begin our analysis with descriptive evidence regarding AC charters. As noted in Figure 
1, AC charters increase in length over our sample period, particularly in response to SOX: the 
average charter length increases from 1,022 words before SOX (i.e., before 2002) to 1,974 words 
after SOX (i.e., after 2002). Given the increase of AC oversight mandated by SOX, this provides 
initial univariate evidence that AC charters do reflect the level of AC responsibilities. The 
prevalence of internal control-related and financial risk-related words in AC charters also rises 
monotonically from year to year. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our main restatements sample. The average length 
of AC charters in our sample is 1,836 words with an interquartile range of 884 words, suggesting 
economically significant variation across ACs and that AC charters are not boilerplate. Similarly, 
the average AC charter discusses internal control-related duties 4.74 times and financial risk-
related duties 1.03 times with interquartile ranges of five and one, respectively. Further, ACs meet 
seven times per year and have four members on average. Finally, the average firm in our sample 
has a market capitalization of $742 million, return on assets of one percent, and market-to-book of 
3.10. In general, the descriptive statistics of our variables are comparable to prior studies (e.g., 
Carcello and Neal 2003; Krishnan, Wen and Zhao 2011; Badolato et al. 2014). 
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 In Table 3 we present Pearson correlations among CHARTER_LENGTH, IC_COUNT, 
FINRISK_COUNT, RESTATE, and the control variables included in Equation (1). 
CHARTER_LENGTH is positively correlated with IC_COUNT (𝜌 = 0.17; p-value < 0.01) and 
negatively correlated with FINRISK_COUNT (𝜌 = -0.04; p-value < 0.10). This suggests that 
financial reporting-related duties drive increases in overall AC oversight rather than unrelated 
duties. Further, the strongest correlation for CHARTER_LENGTH is with AC_MEETINGS (𝜌 = 
0.19; p-value < 0.01). This is expected as both measures capture, to some degree, the extent of AC 
oversight responsibilities. This univariate analysis also indicates a significantly negative relation 
between CHARTER_LENGTH and RESTATE (𝜌 = -0.04; p-value < 0.01), suggesting that greater 
AC responsibility is associated with better monitoring and improved financial reporting reliability. 
We explore these relations in more detail in subsequent multivariate analyses. 
4.2 Determinants of Charter Length 
Next, we provide insights on how AC charter length relates to variables used in prior 
literature to capture corporate governance, including AC and board characteristics. In particular, 
we are interested in AC meetings as a common measure of AC monitoring activity (e.g., Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna 2007) and AC expertise variables that capture competence (e.g., Carcello 
and Neal 2003; Krishnan, Wen and Zhao 2011; Badolato et al. 2014). Table 4 presents results from 
an OLS regression modeling CHARTER_LENGTH as a function of all these variables.  
We find AC meetings, AC accounting expertise, AC legal expertise, and AC busyness are 
all significantly positively associated with AC charter length (p-values < 0.05 or lower), consistent 
with the notion that ACs are assigned more duties (i.e., longer charters) in firms with stronger ACs. 
We also find that AC director tenure is negatively associated with AC charter length (p-value < 
0.01). This is potentially because greater AC duties may create burnout for AC directors – or the 
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inability to serve on the AC for longer time periods due to excessive work demands. As a whole, 
these variables explain forty percent of the variation in AC charter length, which is evidence that 
AC charter length is related to but distinct from existing firm, board, and governance measures.  
4.3 AC Oversight and Financial Reporting Reliability 
Main Analyses of Overload Hypothesis (H1) 
Our first hypothesis addresses the relation between the scope of AC oversight and financial 
reporting reliability. To test this hypothesis, we examine the association between AC charter length 
and financial restatements. If greater responsibility makes ACs more effective, 
CHARTER_LENGTH should be negatively associated with RESTATE. If greater AC responsibility 
overburdens ACs to the point where they are unable to complete all the duties, 
CHARTER_LENGTH may have no association with RESTATE. Results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 5. The coefficient on CHARTER_LENGTH is significantly negative in column 
1 (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that greater overall AC responsibilities make ACs more effective in 
monitoring the financial reporting process. A one standard deviation increase in 
CHARTER_LENGTH is associated with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
experiencing a restatement, which is an 8 percent decrease relative to overall incidence rate of 
restatements in our sample.21  
We use entropy balancing to mitigate potential bias in estimates that results from non-
random treatment assignment. This procedure balances covariates between treatment and control 
groups and brings the treatment variable closer to being independent of other characteristics. In 
this way, entropy balancing reduces model dependence when estimating a treatment effect 
                                                          
21 The coefficient on AC_MEETINGS is positive but insignificant, consistent with the measurement issues associated 




(Hainmueller 2012). Since entropy balancing requires a binary treatment, we sort firms into 
quintiles based on CHARTER_LENGTH. We assign observations in the top quintile to 
TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 1, those in the bottom quintile to TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 0, and 
drop observations in the remaining three quintiles. We then entropy balance the first and second 
moments of each covariate, ensuring that the mean and variance of each covariate is not 
statistically different between the treatment (TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 1) and control groups 
(TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 0). We re-estimate Equation (1) on this balanced sample and present 
results in column 2 of Table 5 which are consistent with our main results in column 1. Overall, the 
results in Table 5 are consistent with the notion that ACs with more responsibilities are more 
effective in monitoring the financial reporting process. 
 As discussed previously, a relevant concern is that ACs can be overburdened if assigned 
too many responsibilities, which could negatively influence their ability to monitor financial 
reporting. Our main analyses suggest ACs with greater responsibilities are more effective in 
monitoring financial reporting. However, overburdening may manifest only at the highest levels 
of ACs oversight and may not be captured by the on-average effect. Thus, as a further test of the 
overload hypothesis, we assign each observation in our sample to a quintile of 
CHARTER_LENGTH, where higher quintiles represent charters with greater length. We then re-
estimate Equation (1) after replacing CHARTER_LENGTH with indicator variables for each 
quintile. Because we omit the QUINTILE 1 indicator from the model, the coefficients on the other 
quintiles in this model capture the effect of each quintile relative to QUINTILE 1.  
As reported in Table 6, the coefficients on all quintile dummy variables are negative, and 
mostly decreasing across quintiles indicating larger effects with more responsibilities. The 
coefficient on QUINTILE 4 is significant at traditional levels (p-value < 0.05), and the coefficient 
22 
 
on QUINTILE 5 is marginally significant (p-value = 0.12).22 Contrary to the AC overload 
hypothesis, these results suggest that the association between AC responsibilities and restatements 
is strongest at the highest levels of responsibility. These results are further evidence that assigning 
the AC higher levels of responsibility does not appear to impair their oversight over financial 
reporting. 
Additional Analyses for H1: Cross-sectional Tests 
We conduct several cross-sectional tests to reinforce our main findings. First, we predict 
that AC oversight is more likely to improve financial reporting reliability when there is a greater 
need for monitoring. For example, at firms recovering from lapses in governance, we expect higher 
levels of AC oversight to improve reporting reliability more. We test this expectation by 
introducing the variable AAER and its interaction with CHARTER_LENGTH into Equation (1). 
We include AAER as our proxy for lapse in governance and measure it as an indicator variable 
equal to one if an AAER against firm i is announced during year t (zero otherwise). This variable 
captures firms that are subject to a financial reporting-related enforcement action from the SEC, 
and we expect that firms seek to ‘clean up their act’ after being sanctioned – which is a scenario 
in which greater AC oversight should be more beneficial.  
We also expect AC monitoring of financial reporting to be more impactful at firms with 
relatively more complex reporting. It logically follows that complex firms are at a greater inherent 
risk of misstating their financials, and that greater AC oversight should help mitigate this risk. We 
test this expectation by including the variable FOREIGN as well as its interaction with 
CHARTER_LENGTH in Equation (1), where FOREIGN is a proxy for firm complexity (which 
equals one if firm i reports non-zero pre-tax foreign income in year t, and zero otherwise).  
                                                          
22 Using F-tests, we note that the coefficient on QUINTILE 5 is not significantly different from the coefficients on 
QUINTILES 2, 3, or 4.  
23 
 
Results for both preceding cross-sectional analyses are presented in Table 7. In the AAER 
cross-section in column 1, the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) is negative and marginally 
significant (p-value = 0.106). In the complexity cross-section in column 2, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is significantly negative (p-value < 0.05). We interpret these results as evidence 
that AC monitoring impacts financial reporting reliability (i.e., the likelihood of a restatement) 
more when the need for such monitoring is greater – in times of lapses in overall governance and 
at complex firms.  
Next, we explore whether the impact of AC oversight varies with the “busyness” of the AC 
members. Ex ante, it is unclear whether the busyness of AC members should have an interactive 
effect with the amount of responsibilities assigned to the AC. On one hand, asking AC members 
who are already busy with multiple other board appointments to undertake high levels of oversight 
may result in overburdening and no improvement to monitoring quality. On the other hand, AC 
members with multiple board appointments may be in demand as a director because of their 
monitoring abilities, and assigning additional oversight to highly capable monitors is likely to 
improve governance. We analyze this question with an interaction of CHARTER_LENGTH and 
AC_BUSY in Equation (1), where AC_BUSY is as defined previously. Results of this analysis are 
presented in column 1 of Table 8. The interaction term (β3) is negative and significant (p-value < 
0.05), suggesting that highly capable directors carry out high levels of oversight effectively, which 
results in fewer restatements. 
Finally, we explore whether the impact of AC oversight varies with the number of meetings 
held by the AC. Assigning oversight responsibility to the AC can only improve financial reporting 
reliability if the committee spends the time and effort to accomplish the duties. We test this 
expectation by introducing into Equation (1) the interaction between CHARTER_LENGTH and 
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AC_MEETINGS. We measure AC_MEETINGS as described previously. Results of this test are 
presented in column 2 of Table 8. The interaction term is negative and significant (p-value < 0.10), 
suggesting that assigning high levels of oversight to the AC (long charters) is more effective in 
reducing restatements when the committee is also diligent in carrying out the duties (more 
meetings). 
Main Analysis of Distraction Hypothesis (H2) 
Our second hypothesis predicts a decrease in financial reporting reliability as the AC takes 
on more duties that are unrelated to financial reporting. As noted previously, we test this hypothesis 
using content-specific charter-based measures, including FINRISK_COUNT and, for comparison, 
IC_COUNT. The former captures the percentage of AC duties that is devoted to financial risk 
management (i.e., unrelated to financial reporting) while the latter measures the percentage of AC 
duties that is devoted to internal controls (i.e., related to financial reporting). Our analysis of 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that greater oversight does not overburden ACs and does not impair 
financial reporting oversight, likely because the majority of AC duties are related to financial 
reporting. Negative consequences of AC overload are more likely to manifest when ACs focus on 
duties that are not related to financial reporting. Consequently, we expect IC_COUNT to be 
negatively associated with restatements, since internal controls are integral to financial reporting, 
and FINRISK_COUNT be positively associated with RESTATE, since financial risk management 
is not directly related to financial reporting. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 9. In column 1, the coefficient on 
IC_COUNT is negative and significant (p-value < 0.10). This result corroborates our earlier 
findings and suggests that it is the oversight related to reporting and control that drives the 
CHARTER_LENGTH results. In column 3, the coefficient on FINRISK_COUNT is positive and 
25 
 
significant (p-value < 0.05). This suggests that assigning ACs duties that distract the committee 
from performing its oversight over financial reporting impairs the overall reliability of financial 
reports. As reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 9, we run these analyses using an entropy-
balanced sample following the methodology described previously and find consistent results. In 
summary, our evidence is consistent with the AC distraction hypothesis in that financial reporting 
reliability is higher for firms with ACs that have significant internal control oversight, but lower 
for firms with ACs that have significant financial risk management oversight responsibilities.  
4.4 Additional Analyses 
Audit Effort 
Given that the AC is responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention, and 
oversight of the external auditor (see Exchange Act 10A-3), we next examine whether the scope 
of the AC’s oversight impacts the AC’s demand for (or the auditor’s supply of) audit effort. It is 
possible that ACs which undertake greater monitoring themselves demand less monitoring from 
the independent auditor, suggesting a substitution effect (Simunic 1980; Anderson, Francis, and 
Stoke, 1993; Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995). In a similar substitution effect, independent 
auditors that perceive stronger internal monitoring in the form of active ACs may estimate lower 
engagement risk and reduce costly effort accordingly. On the other hand, ACs with greater scope 
of oversight may demand more audit evidence and procedures in carrying out this oversight and 
to protect their reputation and promote shareholder interests (Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal 
2002). Similarly, ACs with duties that are unrelated to financial reporting may demand less 
external audit effort because the AC is less focused on ensuring the reliability of financial reports.  
To test this question, we regress the log of audit fees on our three charter-based measures. 
Results are presented in Table 10. In column 1, CHARTER_LENGTH is significantly positively 
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associated with AUDIT_FEES (p-value < 0.05), indicating that ACs with more responsibilities 
also require the auditor to do more work. This effect appears to be driven by ACs that have more 
financial reporting-related duties, as evidenced by a significantly positive coefficient on 
IC_COUNT in column 2 (p-value < 0.01). In column 3, FINRISK_COUNT is significantly 
negatively associated with AUDIT_FEES (p-value < 0.01), indicating that audit fees are lower on-
average when ACs have more oversight duties unrelated to financial reporting reliability. In 
summary, the results in Table 10 suggest that ACs demand more assurance from the independent 
auditor when the AC has greater oversight responsibilities related to financial reporting but less 
when that oversight is unrelated to financial reporting.  
Alternate Measures of AC Responsibilities 
We conduct numerous un-tabulated additional procedures to examine the robustness of our 
results to alternate measures of the scope of AC oversight. First, we calculate 
CHARTERLENGTH_UNIQUE as the natural log of unique words in the charter (meaning each 
word is counted only once, regardless of how many times it is used). Using this adjusted measure, 
which is less likely to be affected by the wordiness of the charter, we find consistent results. 
Second, we calculate CHARTERLENGTH_SCALED as the total number of words in the charter 
scaled by the number of AC members. This variable may be considered a somewhat more specific 
proxy for the scope of AC oversight, as it measures the extent of duties per AC member. We find 
consistent results using this measure. Third, as we have noted previously, our 
CHARTER_LENGTH measure likely picks up duties that are generally related to financial 
reporting oversight since that is the primary function of an AC. To provide greater assurance over 
this assertion, we create another content-specific measure which we name OXFORD_COUNT, 
calculated as the natural log of one plus the number of times that terms contained in the Oxford 
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Dictionary of Accounting appear in the AC charter. We find consistent results when estimating 
Equation (1) with OXFORD_COUNT in the place of CHARTER_LENGTH.  
Disclosure Tendency of the Firm 
It is possible that CHARTER_LENGTH captures a firm’s disclosure tendencies (i.e., firms 
that tend to disclose more may be well-governed firms, which could explain why we find an on-
average reduction in restatements). To address this concern, as our final analysis we rerun our 
main analysis while controlling for 10K_LENGTH (the natural log of the number of words in a 
firm's 10-K in a given year), where 10K_LENGTH is a proxy for a firm’s disclosure style. Un-
tabulated results are consistent with our main analysis, indicating that the effect of 
CHARTER_LENGTH is not due to a correlated omitted factor related to disclosure styles. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Audit committee (AC) responsibilities have increased significantly over the past two 
decades. To the extent that expanding AC responsibilities leads to higher quality monitoring, this 
expansion benefits investors. On the other hand, practitioners suggest increasing AC 
responsibilities may represent harmful “scope creep” that impairs the effectiveness of monitoring. 
In this study, we investigate the relation between the scope of AC oversight and the reliability of 
financial reporting.  
Using new measures of AC oversight that we develop based on hand-collected AC charters 
(which are a required disclosure that delineates the responsibilities of ACs), we provide evidence 
of two important insights. First, our results suggest that greater AC oversight actually improves 
financial reporting reliability on average as evidenced by a reduction in the likelihood of restating 
financial statements. We find that this association is strongest at very high levels of AC 
responsibility. The result is also stronger in times of significant governance lapses, at complex 
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firms, when AC members are capable and experienced, and when ACs also meet often to carry out 
the oversight duties. Second, we provide evidence that the improvement in financial reporting 
reliability is due to AC responsibilities that are related to financial reporting. In sharp contrast, we 
find that financial reporting reliability actually decreases when ACs perform duties that are 
unrelated to financial reporting, consistent with our distraction hypothesis. These insights are 
similar when we analyze audit fees rather than restatements.  
As a whole, our results suggest that ACs with greater oversight are more effective monitors 
of financial reporting and that increasing AC responsibilities improves financial reporting 
reliability. However, consistent with practitioner concerns, our evidence also suggests that 
assigning extraneous oversight duties to the AC (like financial risk management oversight) can 
distract the AC to the detriment of financial reporting reliability. These are particularly important 
insights given the apparently divergent perspectives of regulators and practitioners, where 
regulators lean towards assigning greater oversight responsibilities to the AC and practitioners 
raise concerns that greater duties may make ACs less effective in monitoring financial reporting, 
especially when the duties are unrelated to financial reporting. 
Our results should be interpreted with caveats. First, due to the evolution of disclosure 
requirements and availability of AC charters, our sample is restricted to the years 2000 through 
2006. We argue that this is an appropriate setting to test our research question because corporate 
governance and AC duties were in flux during this time period due to regulations imposed by stock 
exchanges and the SEC, and this enables a rich setting to test our research question. However, 
restricting the analysis to this period limits our ability to speak to current AC oversight trends. 
Second, while our results are robust to entropy balancing, we make no causal inference due to the 
inherent endogenous nature of governance, AC charters, and reporting quality. Third, while our 
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charter-based measures are conceptually superior to measures used in prior literature to capture 
AC oversight, we acknowledge limitations of our measures. For example, activities carried out by 
the AC likely extend beyond those explicitly listed in the charter. Further, many charters are 
carefully vetted by legal counsel to limit disclosures that could increase potential liability for the 
firm or AC members. Such effects may reduce the informativeness of the charters. 
Overall, our findings provide clarity to the AC and governance literature. We inform the 
debate regarding whether ACs should be assigned greater oversight responsibilities and the effect 
that enhanced responsibility has on the ability of the AC to perform its oversight function. This 
should be of interest to academics, regulators, and practitioners who are interested in improving 
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Appendix A    
Variable definitions 
   
 






CHARTER_LENGTH = the natural log of the length of AC charter in words for firm i in year t  
AC Charters 
(hand collected) 
 FINRISK_COUNT = the total number of times any of the following words (including both 
singular and plural forms if applicable) appears in the AC charter of 
firm i in year t (scaled by CHARTER_LENGTH): ‘'hedg*', 'derivativ*', 
'swaps', 'forward contracts', 'financial risk', 'financial exposure', 
'commodity', 'commodities', 'interest rate', 'foreign exchange', 
'exchange rates', 'currency', 'currencies', 'futures', 'trading', 'stock 
options', 'put options', 'call options', 'treasury', 'asset management', 
'investments', 'investing', 'capital structure', 'debt', and 'equity'. We 
multiply this number by 100 for expositional convenience. 
AC Charters 
 
 IC_COUNT = The total number of times any of the following words (including both 
singular and plural form if applicable) appears in the AC charter of 
firm i in year t (scaled by CHARTER_LENGTH): ‘internal control’, 
‘material weakness’, ‘significant deficiency’, ‘control deficiency’, and 
‘control weakness’. We multiply this number by 100 for expositional 
convenience. 
 
 TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = one (zero) if the AC charter is in the top (bottom) quintile of 
CHARTER_LENGTH. This variable is used in entropy balancing 
where the middle three quintiles are discarded. 
AC Charters 
 
 TOP_FINRISKCOUNT = one (zero) if the AC charter is in the top (bottom) quintile of 
FINRISK_COUNT. This variable is used in entropy balancing where 
the middle three quintiles are discarded. 
AC Charters 
 
 TOP_ICCOUNT = one (zero) if the AC charter is in the top (bottom) quintile of 
IC_COUNT. This variable is used in entropy balancing where the 










 AUDIT_FEES = the natural log of audit fees charged to firm i in year t Audit Analytics 
 RESTATE = one if firm i restated the 10-K for year t (zero otherwise) Audit Analytics 
 
    
Governance Control Variables 
 
 AC_BUSY = the average number of boards the AC directors of firm i concurrently 
serve on in year t 
BoardEx 
 AC_MEETINGS = the number of times the AC of firm i held formal meetings in year t AC Charters 
 AC_SIZE = the number of directors on the audit committee for firm i in year t BoardEx 
 AC_TENURE = the average number of years the AC directors of firm i have served on 
the AC as of year t 
BoardEx 
 ACCT_EXPERTISE = one if firm i had an accounting financial expert on the AC in year t 
(zero otherwise); accounting financial expert is defined as someone 
who has prior experience working as a(n): Auditor, CFO, Accounting 
Officer, Chief Accountant, Controller, Certified Public Accountant, 
Chartered Accountant, Head of Accounting, Vice President of 
Accounting, Accounting Director, VP of Finance, or Treasurer 
BoardEx 
 BOARD_INDEP = total independent board members scaled by total board members for 




Appendix A, cont.   
Variable Definitions   
Variable  Definition Source 
 BOARD_SIZE = the number of directors on the board for firm i in year t BoardEx 
 CEO_CHAIR = one if the CEO is the Chairman of the Board for firm i in year t (zero 
otherwise) 
BoardEx 
 LEGAL_EXPERTISE = one if firm i had a legal expert in year t on the audit committee (zero 
otherwise); legal expert is defined as someone who has prior 
experience as an attorney, lawyer, or general counsel or has a Juris 
Doctor or Doctor of Jurisprudence degree (following Krishnan, Wen, 
and Zhao 2011) 
BoardEx 
Other Variables    
 AAER = one if an AAER against firm i is announced during year t (zero 
otherwise) 
SEC 
 CURRENT_ASSETS = current assets scaled by total assets for firm i in year t Compustat 
 DECEMBER = one if the fiscal year for firm i in year t ends in December (zero 
otherwise) 
Compustat 
 FOREIGN = one if firm i reports non-zero pre-tax foreign income in year t (zero 
otherwise) 
Compustat 
 GOING_CONCERN = one if the auditor issued a going concern opinion for firm i in year t 
(zero otherwise) 
Audit Analytics 
 INST_OWN = the percent of firm i owned by institutional owners in year t Thomson Reuters 
 ISSUANCE = one if firm i issued equity or debt equal in year t equal to than 10% of 
total assets in year t 
Compustat 
 LEVERAGE = long term debt scaled by total assets for firm i in year t Compustat 
 LOSS = one if firm i reports net income less than zero in year t (zero 
otherwise) 
Compustat 
 MTB = market value of equity scaled by book value of equity for firm i in 
year t 
Compustat 
 QUICK_RATIO = current assets minus inventory, all scaled by current liabilities for 
firm i in year t 
Compustat 
 ROA = net income scaled by total assets for firm i in year t Compustat 
 SEGMENTS = the number of geographic and business segments for firm i in year t Compustat 
 SIZE = natural log of market value of equity for firm i in year t Compustat 






Topics in Audit Committee Charters 
 
 
 Based on manual analysis of 100 AC charters    
and mapped to related regulation Required by (as of year):   
SEC* 
Auditing 
Standards* NYSE* NASD* AMEX* 
  
Organization / membership 
    
 
 
Independence of members (B) 2003-04 
 
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Independence exception 
  
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Financial literacy of members 
  
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Financial expertise of members 
  
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Review and update charter annually 
  
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Prepare audit committee report (A) 2000 
   
  
Authority to engage advisors (B) 2003-04 
   
  






    
  






    
  
Serve on limited # of other boards 
    
  
Minimum number of meetings 
    
(L) 2004  
Number of members 
  
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Request other committees to also monitor 
    
 
Financial reporting and disclosure 
    
 
 









Judgment, estimates (A) 2000 (D) 1989 
(F) 2000 
 


































 Review/evaluate internal control  (C) 1988 (J) 2004   
 Review internal control findings of independent 
auditor 
  (J) 2004   
 Review information system controls      
       
* Legend (relevant regulation)      
 A -    Release No. 34-42266 E -    SAS 71 I -    SR-NYSE-99-39  
 B -    SOX F -    SAS 90 J -    SR-NYSE-2002-33  
 C -    SAS 60 G -   SR-NASD-99-48 K -   SR-AMEX-99-38     
 D -    SAS 61 H -   Release No 34-48745 L -   SR-AMEX-2003-65  
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Standards NYSE NASD AMEX 
Independent Auditor 
    
  
Auditor selection (B) 2003-04 
 
(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  
Audit fee approval (B) 2003-04 
   
  
Non-audit services approval (B) 2003-04 




(I) 2001 (G) 2001 (K) 2001  















Independence: written auditor statement 
  


































Employing other audit firms 
    
  




















    
 
Fraud 
    
 
 
Procedure to receive complaints (B) 2003-04 
   
  
Fraud 




 General legal, regulatory compliance   (J) 2004   
 Meet with general counsel      
 Code of ethics / code of conduct      
 Illegal acts      
 Foreign corrupt practices      
       
       
Legend (relevant regulation)      
 A -    Release No. 34-42266 E -    SAS 71 I -    SR-NYSE-99-39  
 B -    SOX F -    SAS 90 J -    SR-NYSE-2002-33  
 C -    SAS 60 G -   SR-NASD-99-48 K -   SR-AMEX-99-38     
 D -    SAS 61 H -   Release No 34-48745 L -   SR-AMEX-2003-65  
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  Required by (as of year):   
SEC 
Auditing 
Standards NYSE NASD AMEX 
Other 
    
 
 






   
(H) 2004  
        
Also: accounting personnel, executive officer expense account review, tax, asset management, 
investments, employee benefit plans, pensions, review clarity of disclosure, review auditor 
assessment of materiality, insurance, budget, capital structure, SEC comment letters, dividends, 
operational efficiency, environmental 
 
Disclaimers 
    
 
 
Not the responsibility of the AC to plan/conduct audits   
Not the responsibility of the AC to determine that financials are complete/accurate   
Not the duty of the AC to assure compliance with laws, regulations, code of ethics and conduct   








Legend (relevant regulation)  
 A -    Release No. 34-42266 E -    SAS 71 I -    SR-NYSE-99-39  
 B -    SOX F -    SAS 90 J -    SR-NYSE-2002-33  
 C -    SAS 60 G -   SR-NASD-99-48 K -   SR-AMEX-99-38     
 D -    SAS 61 H -   Release No 34-48745 L -   SR-AMEX-2003-65  
    





















                _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
         
This figure depicts the time trend in the average number of words in AC charters (left axis) and the average 










































































     
Sample selection      
      
 
Firm-year observations at the intersection of Compustat and BoardEx (2000-2006) 
 
18,753 
      
DEF 14A filings on SEC EDGAR for sample firms  21,114 
Charters obtained from DEF 14A filings 10,070 
Less: Charters for firms not on NYSE, NASD, or AMEX (44) 
Base sample of firm-year observations with charters 10,026 
Less: Observations missing data to compute necessary variables (4,397) 
  
Final sample of firm-year observations used in restatements analysis 5,629 
      






Descriptive statistics for restatements sample (n = 5,629) 
           
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
 25%  Median  75% 
           
Test Variable           
   CHARTER_LENGTH (in words)  1,836.36  661.99  1,359.00  1,765.00  2,243.00 
   IC_COUNT (in words)  4.74  3.56  2.00  4.00  7.00 
   FINRISK_COUNT (in words)  1.03  1.20  0.00  1.00  1.00 
           
Dependent Variable 
 
          
  RESTATE (binary)  0.17  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00 
           
Governance Control Variables           
   AC_MEETINGS  7.17  3.35  5.00  7.00  9.00 
   ACCT_EXPERTISE (binary)  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00  1.00 
   LEGAL_EXPERTISE (binary)  0.38  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00 
   AC_BUSY  3.30  1.69  2.00  3.00  4.00 
   AC_SIZE  4.01  1.21  3.00  4.00  5.00 
   AC_TENURE  6.65  4.16  3.68  5.82  8.85 
   BOARD_SIZE  11.16  3.61  8.00  11.00  14.00 
   BOARD_INDEP  0.55  0.16  0.45  0.56  0.67 
   CEO_CHAIR (binary)  0.59  0.49  0.00  1.00  1.00 
           
Other Control Variables 
 
          
  SIZE  6.61  1.80  5.43  6.53  7.76 
   MTB  3.10  3.55  1.52  2.22  3.61 
   LEVERAGE  0.17  0.19  0.00  0.11  0.27 
   ISSUANCE (binary)  0.33  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00 
   ROA  0.01  0.15  0.00  0.03  0.07 
   INST_OWN  0.55  0.29  0.31  0.57  0.78 
           
 
This table reports descriptive statistics. The sample period is from 2000 through 2006. CHARTER_LENGTH is the length of 
the audit committee charter for firm i in year t. In this table, we present this variable as the raw number of words. In 











Pearson correlations (n = 5,629) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
  
1 CHARTER_LENGTH                   
2 IC_COUNT 0.17                  
3 FINRISK_COUNT -0.03 -0.08                 
4 RESTATE -0.04 -0.03 0.03                
5 AC_MEETINGS 0.19 0.12 -0.01 0.01               
6 ACCT_EXPERTISE 0.10 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.12              
7 LEGAL_EXPERTISE 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.02             
8 AC_BUSY 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02            
9 AC_SIZE 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.01           
10 AC_TENURE -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.14 0.06 -0.12 0.03          
11 BOARD_SIZE 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.54 0.11         
12 BOARD_INDEP 0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.06 0.19 -0.02 -0.08        
13 CEO_CHAIR -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.10       
14 SIZE 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.06 0.10 0.23 0.31 0.05 0.65 -0.15 0.16      
15 MTB -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.15     
16 LEVERAGE 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.13 -0.13 0.06 0.14 -0.06    
17 ISSUANCE 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.33   
18 ROA 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.08 0.13 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.00 -0.11  
19 INST_OWN 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.29 -0.11 0.09 0.50 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.20 
 
This table provides Pearson correlations for primary variables. The sample period is from 2000 through 2006. CHARTER_LENGTH is the natural log of the number of words in the audit 





Table 4   
The association between CHARTER_LENGTH and governance characteristics 
 
CHARTER_LENGTHit = β0 + β1AC_MEETINGSit + βnGovernance 
Characteristics + βkFixed Effects + eit 
 
   
 Coeff. t-Stat  
    
AC_MEETINGS 0.0087 5.44 *** 
ACCT_EXPERTISE 0.0262 2.38 ** 
LEGAL_EXPERTISE 0.0368 3.24 *** 
AC_BUSY 0.0107 3.51 *** 
AC_SIZE -0.0092 -1.76 * 
AC_TENURE -0.0063 -4.93 *** 
BOARD_SIZE 0.0026 1.20  
BOARD_INDEP -0.0099 -0.29  
CEO_CHAIR -0.0144 -1.32  
SIZE -0.0031 -0.66  
    
    
Industry Fixed Effects    Y  
Year Fixed Effects    Y  
Stock Exchange Fixed Effects    Y  
Adjusted R2    0.409  
Observations    6,924  
 
This table reports results from an OLS regression relating audit committee charter length to 
governance variables for NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. The dependent variable 
is CHARTER_LENGTH, which is equal to the natural log of the number of words in the audit 
committee charter for firm i in year t. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Industry is 
defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed 
















Table 5       
The association between charter variables and restatements 
 
RESTATEit = β0 + β1Charter_Variablesit + βnControls + eit 
 
  (1)  (2) 
 Dep. Var. = RESTATE  RESTATE 
 (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat  
Charter 
variables 
CHARTER_LENGTH                     (-) -0.0363 -2.10 **     
TOP_CHARTERLENGTH             (-)     -0.0622 -1.82 * 
         
Governance 
controls 
AC_MEETINGS                             0.0013 0.71   0.0010 0.26  
ACCT_EXPERTISE 0.0014 0.12   0.0064 0.24  
LEGAL_EXPERTISE -0.0034 -0.27   0.0526 2.02 ** 
 AC_BUSY -0.0017 -0.41   -0.0121 -1.53  
 AC_SIZE -0.0018 -0.31   -0.0118 -1.08  
 AC_TENURE 0.0010 0.65   0.0002 0.07  
 BOARD_SIZE -0.0015 -0.59   0.0054 1.14  
 BOARD_INDEP -0.1571 -3.52 ***  -0.1888 -2.13 ** 
 CEO_CHAIR 0.0125 1.01   0.0345 1.38  
         
Firm  
controls 
SIZE 0.0024 0.41   -0.0038 -0.34  
MTB -0.0032 -2.05 **  -0.0057 -1.93 * 
LEVERAGE 0.0846 1.96 **  -0.0206 -0.29  
 ISSUANCE 0.0047 0.37   -0.0448 -1.88 * 
 ROA -0.0825 -2.09 **  0.0124 0.16  
 INST_OWN 0.0815 2.85 ***  0.1453 2.86 *** 
         
 Industry Fixed Effects Y  Y 
 Year Fixed Effects Y  Y 
 Stock Exchange Fixed Effects Y  Y 
 Entropy Balanced Sample N  Y 
 Adjusted R2 0.056  0.160 
 Observations 5,629  1,940 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating financial reporting reliability to the scope of AC oversight for 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals one if the firm restated the 10-K 
for year t. In column 1, the sample consists of all observations with requisite data and the independent variable of interest is 
CHARTER_LENGTH, which is the natural log of the number of words in the audit committee charter for firm i in year t. For column 2, 
we sort observations into quintiles based on CHARTER_LENGTH. We assign observations in the top quintile to 
TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 1 and the bottom quintile to TOP_CHARTERLENGTH = 0; the remaining quintiles are discarded. We 
entropy balance the first and second moments of each covariate. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Industry is defined at 
the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 











Table 6     
Quintile regression 
 
RESTATEit = β0 +βnCharter_Length Quintilsit + βmControls + eit 
 
 
  (1)  
 Dep. Var. = RESTATE  
 (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   
Charter 
variables 
QUINTILE 2          [β2]                  (?) -0.0250 -0.96   
QUINTILE 3          [β3]                  (?) -0.0320 -1.17   
QUINTILE 4          [β4]                  (?) -0.0542 -1.98 **  
 QUINTILE 5          [β5]                  (?) -0.0440 -1.56 #  
      
Tests of differences in coefficients  F-stat   
 β5 = β2  0.97   
 β5 = β3  0.58   
 β5 = β4  0.51   
      
      
 Governance and Firm Controls Y  
 Industry Fixed Effects Y  
 Year Fixed Effects Y  
 Stock Exchange Fixed Effects Y  
 Adjusted R2 0.056  
 Observations 5,629  
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating financial reporting reliability to the scope of AC 
oversight for NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. We sort firms into quintiles based on 
CHARTER_LENGTH, assigning observations with the lowest (highest) values to QUINTILE 1 
(QUINTILE 5). The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals one if the firm restated the 10-K for 
year t. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered 



















Table 7         
The moderating effects of governance lapses and firm complexity 
 




   
(1)  (2) 
Dep. Var. = RESTATE  RESTATE 
PARTITION  =  AAER  FOREIGN 
                                                                                 (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat  
CHARTER_LENGTH [β1]   -0.0354 -2.05 **  -0.0145 -0.77  
PARTITION [β2]   2.3121 1.65 *  0.5745 2.30 ** 
CHARTER_LENGTH * PARTITION                           [β3]  (-) -0.2919 -1.62 #  -0.0735 -2.21 ** 
           
Total Effect of CHARTER_LENGTH  
when PARTITION = 1 [F-stat]                             β1 + β3  (-) -0.3274 [3.28] * 
 
-0.0880 [8.28] *** 
           
Governance and Firm Controls    Y  Y 
Industry Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Stock Exchange Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Adjusted R2    0.057  0.058 
Observations    5,629  5,629 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating financial reporting reliability to the scope of AC oversight for 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals one if the firm restated the 10-K for 
year t. AAER is equal to one if an AAER against firm i is announced during year t (zero otherwise). FOREIGN is equal to one if firm i has 
pre-tax foreign income in year t (and zero otherwise).  Control variables, while included in the regression, are repressed. All variables are 
as defined in Appendix A. Industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are 
















Table 8         
The moderating effects of director busyness and AC diligence 
RESTATEit = β0 + β1Charter_Lengthit + β2Partitionit + β3Charter_Lengthit*Partitionit + βnControls + eit 
 
 
   
(1)  (2) 
Dep. Var. = RESTATE  RESTATE 
PARTITION =  AC_BUSY  AC_MEETINGS 
                                                                                 (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat  
CHARTER_LENGTH [β1]   0.0338 1.01   0.0166 0.50  
PARTITION [β2]   0.1612 2.28 **  0.0613 1.83 * 
PARTITION * CHARTER_LENGTH                           [β3]  (?) -0.0220 -2.36 **  -0.0080 -1.81 * 
           
           
Total Effect of CHARTER_LENGTH  
at the mean of AC_BUSY [F-stat]                             β1 + (3.30 * β3)  (?) -0.0388 [5.00] ** 
 
   
Total Effect of CHARTER_LENGTH  
at the mean of AC_MEETINGS [F-stat]                   β1 + (7.17 * β3)  (?)    
 
-0.0407 [5.35] ** 
           
Governance and Firm Controls    Y  Y 
Industry Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Stock Exchange Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Adjusted R2    0.058  0.057 
Observations    5,629  5,629 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating financial reporting reliability to the scope of AC oversight for 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals one if the firm restated the 10-K for 
year t. AC_BUSY is the average number of board positions held by the firm’s AC members in year t. AC_MEETINGS is the number of 
AC meetings held in year t.  Control variables, while included in the regression, are repressed. All variables are as defined in Appendix 
A. Industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are based on robust standard 








Table 9  
The association between financial risk oversight duties in AC charters and RESTATE 
RESTATEit = β0 + β1Charter_Variablesit + βnControls + eit 
 
 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
 
(4) 
Dep. Var. = RESTATE  RESTATE  RESTATE  RESTATE 
                                   (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-stat  
IC_COUNT                           (-) -0.0627 -1.69 *             
TOP_ICCOUNT                    (-)     -0.0348 -1.68 *         
FINRISK_COUNT                (+)         0.2302 2.26 **     
TOP_FINRISKCOUNT        (+)             0.0340 1.70 * 
                
                
Governance and firm controls Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry FE Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y  Y 
Stock Exchange FE Y  Y  Y  Y 
Entropy Balanced Sample N  Y  N  Y 
Adjusted R2 0.056  0.072  0.057  0.084 
Observations 5,629  2,231  5,629  2,674 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating financial reporting reliability to the scope of AC oversight for 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 2000-2006. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals one if the firm restated the 10-K for 
year t. In column 1 (column 3), IC_COUNT (FINRISK_COUNT) is the number of times the AC charter mentions the words related to internal 
control (financial risk) oversight described in Appendix A, scaled by CHARTER_LENGTH. In column 2 (column 4), we sort observations 
into quintiles based on IC_COUNT (FINRISK_COUNT). We assign observations in the top quintile to TOP_ICCOUNT 
(TOP_FINRISKCOUNT) = 1 and the bottom quintile to TOP_ICCOUNT (TOP_FINRISKCOUNT) = 0; the remaining quintiles are discarded. 
We entropy balance the first and second moments of each covariate. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. Control variables, 
while included in each regression, are repressed. Industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 
99. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, 

















The association between AC charter measures and AUDIT_FEES 
AUDIT_FEESit = β0 + β1Charter_Variablesit + βnControls + eit 
 
  (1)  (2)  (2) 
 Dep. Var. = AUDIT_FEES  AUDIT_FEES  AUDIT_FEES 
 (pred) Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat   Coeff. t-Stat  
Charter 
variables 
CHARTER_LENGTH        (?) 0.0745 2.57 **         
IC_COUNT                       (?)     0.1640 2.74 ***     
FINRISK_COUNT            (?)         -0.4043 -2.82 *** 
             
Governance 
controls 
AC_MEETINGS 0.0256 7.43 ***  0.0261 7.59 ***  0.0263 7.63 *** 
ACCT_EXPERTISE -0.0017 -0.08   -0.0002 -0.01   -0.0005 -0.02  
LEGAL_EXPERTISE 0.0080 0.37   0.0106 0.49   0.0088 0.41  
 AC_BUSY 0.0120 1.85 *  0.0123 1.91 *  0.0121 1.87 * 
 AC_SIZE 0.0098 0.99   0.0091 0.92   0.0099 0.99  
 AC_TENURE -0.0143 -5.68 ***  -0.0147 -5.81 ***  -0.0150 -5.94 *** 
 BOARD_SIZE 0.0083 1.75 *  0.0079 1.67 *  0.0082 1.74 * 
 BOARD_INDEP 0.2822 4.09 ***  0.2279 4.03 ***  0.2793 4.05 *** 
 CEO_CHAIR 0.0363 1.74 *  0.0352 1.68 *  0.0369 1.77 * 
             
Firm controls 
SIZE_ASSETS 0.4759 42.06 ***  0.4747 42.07 ***  0.4761 42.14 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.1589 2.16 **  0.1642 2.25 **  0.1622 2.23 ** 
LOSS 0.1118 4.09 ***  0.1157 4.24 ***  0.1149 4.21 *** 
 ROA -0.4097 -5.59 ***  -0.4022 -5.50 ***  -0.4072 -5.55 *** 
 CURRENT_ASSETS 0.4836 6.28 ***  0.4823 6.25 ***  0.4854 6.29 *** 
 QUICK_RATIO -0.0270 -6.58 ***  -0.0269 -6.56 ***  -0.0268 -6.56 *** 
 FOREIGN 0.2813 10.65 ***  0.2833 10.71 ***  0.2828 10.73 *** 
 SEGMENTS 0.0504 10.66 ***  0.0500 10.54 ***  0.0501 10.63 *** 
 DECEMBER 0.1672 6.84 ***  0.1709 7.01 ***  0.1686 6.91 *** 
 GOING_CONCERN 0.3044 2.66 ***  0.3109 2.68 ***  0.2981 2.57 ** 
             
 Industry Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y 
 Year Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y 
 Stock Exchange Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y 
 Adjusted R2 0.784  0.784  0.784 
 Observations 5,938  5,938  5,938 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating audit fees to the scope of AC oversight for NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms from 
2000-2006. The dependent variable is AUDIT_FEES, which is the natural log of a firm’s audit fees in year t. CHARTER_LENGTH is the 
natural log of the number of words in the AC charter for firm i in year t. FINRISK_COUNT is the number of times the AC charter mentions 
the words related to financial risk oversight described in Appendix A, scaled by CHARTER_LENGTH. All other variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. Industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. T-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
